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The Art of Verbal Engineering
Rita L. Marker*
Wesley J. Smith**
"If thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought."1
Many years ago, a little girl and her parents immigrated to the
United States from what was then Yugoslavia. A short time
later, the little girl started first grade even though she spoke lit-
tle English. She was anxious to learn and listened carefully,
picking up words and phrases.
One afternoon, the teacher called on the little girl, and told her
to go to the blackboard and draw "light lines." Eagerly, she went
to the front of the classroom, picked up the chalk and began to
draw a barrel. When the teacher became angry and the little
girl's classmates laughed, the little girl realized that in English,
"light" did not mean "barrel" as it did in her native language.
The word that had sounded so familiar to her meant something
entirely different.
More than seventy-five years have passed since that day. The
once little girl married, raised a family, and is now a widow.
English has been the woman's main language for decades.
But, once again, familiar sounding words are having different
meanings. When she hears people speak of compassion, comfort,
care, dignity and rights, her understanding of those words differs
from theirs.
Sometimes the woman feels like she did while in the first
grade. Familiar terms are foreign to her.
The woman's misunderstanding of a word could now have far
greater significance than her confusion in the classroom so many
years ago. Then, it meant sadness and embarrassment for her.
Now, it could mean the difference between life and death. A
* Rita L. Marker is executive director of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task
Force and the author of Deadly Compassion (Wim. Morrow & Co.).
** Wesley J. Smith is a consumer advocate and author, and is an attorney for the
International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, 4 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS,
JouRNALIsM AND LErrERs OF GEORGE ORWELL 127, 137 (Sonie Orwell and Ian Angus eds.,
1968).
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seemingly clear statement such as, "if I am terminally ill, the
only medical treatment I want is comfort care," could be inter-
preted today as a request for death by lethal overdose from a per-
son who may have months or even years of remaining life.
Only a short time ago, any serious suggestion that administra-
tion of carbon monoxide poisoning is a "procedure" that consti-
tutes a "heroic effort" to control suffering would have been met
with incredulity. Likewise, a reference to this "procedure" as "a
kind of new age hospice care" would have been beyond belief.
Yet, these very claims were made by Stanley Levy, M.D., an
internal medicine physician who specializes in geriatrics.2
In few social movements has the interpretation of words been
as important as in the debate over euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide. Additionally, in few social movements have words ever
been so effectively used to first blur, then completely obliterate,
the line between the acceptable and the repugnant.
Regardless of one's views about assisted suicide and euthana-
sia, an understanding of the words used when they are discussed
is vitally important. This importance is underscored by a chang-
ing relationship between patients and health care providers, a
relationship increasingly characterized less as a patient-physi-
cian relationship and more as a consumer-provider transaction.
In practice, the consumer/patient and the doctor/provider are
often placed in a position subordinate to that of the managed
care bureaucrat. Health care consumers deserve and desper-
ately need to know how definitions have changed, and they have
a right to know that these changes affect them profoundly.
I. RESHAPING PERCEPTIONS
On January 27, 1939, in an article titled, "'Mercy Death' Law
proposed in State," the New York Times reported that the Eutha-
nasia Society of America had drafted a bill to "legalize painless
killing."' Charles E. Nixdorff, the group's treasurer, took issue
with both the article's title and its reference to killing and, in a
letter to the editor, wrote that the words "killing" and "death"
had sinister connotations. He suggested that it would be better
to describe euthanasia as "merciful release" so that the public
would not fear the Society's proposal.4
2. Kevorkian Takes Stand in Own Defense, N.Y. Tnvms, Apr. 28, 1994, at AS. Dr.
Levy called Jack Kevorkian's activities "new age hospice care" while testifying for the
defense during Kevorkian's trial in the death of Thomas Hyde, who died of carbon monox-
ide poisoning on August 4, 1993.
3. 'Mercy Death' Law proposed in State, N.Y.Tmms, Jan. 27, 1939, at 21.
4. Letter to the Editor from Charles E. Nixdorff, Treasurer, Euthanasia Society of
America, Explaining Euthanasia, N.Y. TImms, Jan. 30, 1939, at 12.
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Neither the newspaper, nor an official of Nixdorffs own organi-
zation, however, heeded his advice. Euthanasia continued to be
described in blunt terms. The public was horrified when Dr. Fos-
ter Kennedy, president of the Euthanasia Society of America,
explained that the primary purpose of his group's legislative pro-
posal was to eventually legalize euthanasia for "born defectives
who are doomed to remain defective, rather than for normal per-
sons who have become miserable through incurable illness.
" 5
Euthanasia proponents have learned a lot about public rela-
tions in the six decades since the Euthanasia Society of America
made the first attempt to gain legislative approval for mercy kill-
ing. One lesson they have heeded is that all social engineering is
preceded by verbal engineering. If words or their meanings can
be changed, the quest to change hearts and minds will be
achieved.
Today when mercy killing is discussed, it is couched in euphe-
misms: words of gentleness or the language of rights. Titles of
euthanasia advocacy groups contain words like "compassion,"
"choice" and "dignity." Even the Euthanasia Society of America
has undergone name changes to present a more positive image
(in 1976 the Euthanasia Society of America changed its name to
the Society for the Right to Die and, in 1991, it became known as
Choice in Dying).
No longer does anyone but its strongest opponent refer to
mercy killing. The word "euthanasia" is generally avoided in
proposals to legalize it. Old words are replaced or given differ-
ent, vague meanings.
Like a constantly changing kaleidoscope, meanings shift ever
so slightly, forming new patterns of thinking. Slowly, quietly,
but inexorably, the previously appalling is transformed into the
presently appealing.
The manner in which words are defined is key to achieving
this transformation. This is something that Dutch euthanasia
practitioner Dr. M.A.M. Wachter, the ethicist/director for the
Institute of Health in the Netherlands, knows well. Speaking at
a 1990 international euthanasia gathering, he stated, "[tihe defi-
nition builds the road for euthanasia."6 He acknowledged that
"euthanasia is the intentional ending of the life of another ... it
is always a question of terminating human life" then went on to
urge that careful attention be paid to definitions.
5. 'Mercy Death' Law Ready For Albany, N.Y. Tuds, Feb. 14, 1939, at 2.
6. Dr. M.A.M. Wachter, Keynote Address at the eighth biennial conference of the




"Definitions are not neutral," Dr. Wachter said. "They are not
just the innocent tools that allow us to describe reality. Rather,
they shape our perceptions of reality. They select. They empha-
size. They embody a bias. Therefore definitions constantly need
redefinition.
II. A PRECLUSIONARY DEFINITION
So cognizant are the Dutch of this power of definitions that
they have managed to define euthanasia in such a way that it
literally precludes any finding of nonvoluntary euthanasia. In
1985, the Government Commission on Euthanasia defined
"euthanasia" as "the deliberate termination of another's life at
his request."" Since the definition requires that there is only
euthanasia when the patient requests death, any non-requested
mercy killing that would ordinarily be called "nonvoluntary
euthanasia" cannot be referred to as a euthanasia death. In
effect, nonvoluntary euthanasia has been defined out of exist-
ence. This is particularly ironic since the practice of ending
patients' lives has given doctors such unprecedented power that
it is primarily Dutch doctors, not patients, who determine who
will die at their hands.
The first official confirmation of the prevalence of nonvolun-
tary euthanasia in the Netherlands-came on September 10, 1991,
when the long-awaited government report, Medical Decisions
About the End of Life,9 was released. Popularly known as the
Remmelink Report (named after the chairman of the committee
that issued it), the study documents the degree to which doctors
have taken over the decision making on questions of euthanasia.
The findings of the Remmelink Report indicated that, in one
year, Dutch physicians deliberately ended the lives of thousands
7. Id.
8. STATE COMMTrEE ON EUTHANASIA, REPORT ON EUTHANASIA, GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE, THE HAGUE (1985). This definition was also used in the 1991 Remme-
link Report, and in the summary brochure, Ministerie van Justite, MEDICAL PRACTICE
wrrH REGARD TO EUTHANAsIA AND RELATED MEDICAL DECISIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS 3
(1991). The summary brochure was distributed by Dutch consulates and embassies in
response'to inquiries about the Remmelink Report.
9. The official government report, Medische Beslissingen Rond Het Levenseinde,
Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat (1991), TIHF HAGUE, was released in two volumes. The 294-
page report ("Remmelink Report") was the work of the Committee to Investigate the Med-
ical Practice Concerning Euthanasia appointed in January 17, 1990, by the minister of
justice and the state secretary for welfare, public health, and culture. The six member
committee was chaired by Professor J. Remmelink, M.J., the attorney general of the High
Council of the Netherlands and professor emeritus of criminal law at the Free University.
To assure accurate and complete information, physicians who provided data were granted
total anonymity and immunity by the Dutch government.
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of patients by administering or providing lethal doses or fatal
injections:
* Twenty-three hundred people died as a result of doctors killing
them upon request.' 0
* Four hundred people killed themselves with medication provided by
their doctors for that purpose."
* One thousand people, an average of three each day, died when doc-
tors prescribed, provided or administered a medication with the
specific purpose of causing death even though the patient had made
no explicit request for euthanasia.12 Of these patients, 14% were
fully competent' 3 while 72% had never given any indication regard-
ing termination of life.'
4
* In addition, 8,100 patients died as a result of doctors deliberately
giving them overdoses of pain medication with the specific intent of
hastening the patient's death.' 5 The decision to administer the
intentional overdose was not discussed with 4,941 (61%) patients,
even though 2,187 (27%) of patients who died in this manner were
fully competent.'
6
As indicated by the above figures, 11,800 deaths were induced
by Dutch physicians in one year. Of great significance for this
discussion is the fact that more than one half of those deaths were
unrequested by the patients who died. This is clearly
nonvoluntary euthanasia. Because of the way in which the
Dutch define euthanasia, however, those unrequested deaths are
categorized as "deliberate life-terminating actions without
explicit request" and fall within a classification of "terminal
care."
17
The Dutch ability to frame unrequested deaths as something
other than nonvoluntary euthanasia has been nothing short of a
public relations masterpiece; masterful in keeping the true
import and consequences of legitimized euthanasia from being
clearly acknowledged. It should be noted, however, that eutha-
nasia by any other name is still euthanasia. Or, better stated:
Killing is killing is killing.
10. Remmelink Report, vol. I, at 13 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Remrnelink Report, vol. II, at 49, tbl. 6.4.
14. Id. at 50, tbl. 6.6.
15. According to the Remmelink Report, 22,500 deaths (about 17.3% of all deaths)
in the Netherlands in one year occurred after dosages of pain medication to patients that
may have shortened life. Remmelink Report, vol. I, at 16. Of these, 36% took place with
the physician's deliberate intent to cause the patient's death. Remmelink Report, vol. II,
at 58, tbl. 7.2. As a clarification of the intent, it may be useful to recognize that in 64% of
such deaths, the stated intent was to kill the pain; in the remaining 36%, a stated intent
was to kill the patient.
16. Remmelink Report, vol. II, at 61, tbl. 7.7.
17. Ministerie van Justitie, supra note 8, at 5.
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A similar sleight of word has been employed in euthanasia and
assisted suicide proposals in the United States.
III. LANGUAGE AS OBFUSCATION
From 1988 through 1992, during campaigns to legalize eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide in California (1988 and 1992)8 and in
Washington (1991)19, the phrase of choice among euthanasia pro-
ponents was "aid-in-dying." The words conjured up images of
plumping the pillow, wiping the brow and holding the hand of a
patient. But these were not the types of aid that would have
been legalized. "Aid-in-dying" was defined in the measures'
small print as "aid" that was to be directly and intentionally pro-
vided to "end the life"20 or "terminate the life"21 of a qualified
patient.
Although the exact method for delivering the new death-induc-
ing medical service was not specified, proponents acknowledged
that it would probably be accomplished by means of a lethal
injection or drug overdose. They went to great lengths, however,
to conceal this. "Try not to go into methods of aid-in-dying such
as lethal injections" was the advice given in a speakers' packet
formulated by the Friends of Initiative 119, an umbrella group
for the Washington state measure's supporters. Instead, speak-
ers were advised to say that Initiative 119 was needed to "protect
our rights as patients." Audiences were to be told that the mea-
sure was needed to correct flaws that had been discovered by
members of the medical community in the state's outdated Liv-
ing Will law.22 The measure was similarly described on national
television when a news program described the Initiative as a pro-
posal "to clarify language in Living Wills."
23
Although the proposed laws in California and Washington
would have permitted euthanasia by lethal injection and assisted
suicide by prescribed drug overdoses, they each categorized such
18. The campaign to place the "Humane and Dignified Death Act" which would
have legalized euthanasia and assisted suicide under the name, "aid-in-dying," failed to
gain enough signatures to be placed on the 1988 California ballot. California's "Death
with Dignity Act," (Proposition 161) which would have permitted "aid-in-dying" did qual-
ify for the ballot, but failed on November 3, 1992 by a vote of 54% to 46%.
19. Washington state voters turned down the "Death with Dignity Act" (Initiative
119) that would have legalized "aid-in-dying" on November 5, 1991 by a vote of 54% to
46%.
20. Initiative 119, Section 2 (9) (Wa. 1991).
21. Proposition 161, Section 2525.2 (k) (Ca. 1992).
22. SUGGESTIONS FOR SPEAKERS, and SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR SPEECH ON INIrIATIVE
119, distributed at July 1, 1991 meeting of Spokane (WA) Friends of Initiative 119. The
meeting was chaired by Rob Neils, Spokane County coordinator for Hemlock of Washing-
ton State.
23. Newsday (CNN television broadcast, July 31, 1991).
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actions as something other than mercy killing or suicide. Califor-
nia's proposal stated: "Requesting and receiving aid-in-dying by
a qualified patient in accordance with this title shall not, for any
purpose, constitute a suicide,"' and "[niothing in this Act shall
be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing."
25
Washington's attempt to carve aid-in-dying out of the defini-
tional suicide and euthanasia niche read: "Nothing in this chap-
ter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy
killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission
to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying and
to permit death with dignity through the provision of aid-in-
dying.... "26 As in the Netherlands, these proposals would have
permitted euthanasia and assisted suicide while denying that
either of those names or the label of mercy killing applied.
Voters in Washington and California did recognize, however,
that "aid-in-dying" was merely a deceptively soothing term for
the crime of murder under those states' laws and the proposals
failed to gain public approval. The public at large, it seems, did
not favor turning the specter of a lethal syringe-wielding physi-
cian into a reality, whether called "aid-in-dying" or the more apt
description, "killing."
IV. EUPHEMISMS R Us
Following the abortive attempts in Washington and Califor-
nia, euthanasia advocates went back to the drawing board to
reframe their rhetoric. In preparation for a new initiative cam-
paign then being formulated for Oregon, a poll was commis-
sioned in 1993 by the newly formed Euthanasia Research and
Guidance Organization (ERGO!). The poll, which was ERGO!'s
first activity, was designed to determine "if euphemisms allow
people to come to grips with brutal facts which, stated another
way, would be repugnant to them."
27
Not surprisingly, results indicated that people would be more
inclined to vote for laws that were couched in euphemisms. The
poll indicated that the greatest number of respondents (65%)
would favor a law using the terminology "to die with dignity."
2
1
As the drafting process of what would eventually be known as
Measure 16, Oregon's "Death with Dignity Act," went on, infor-
24. Proposition 161, Section 2525.16 (Ca. 1992).
25. Id. at Section 2525.23.
26. Initiative 119, Section 10 (Wa. 1991), emphasis added.
27. DEREK HuMPmY, WHAT'S IN A woRD? RESULTS OF ROPER POLL CONDUCTED FOR
ERGO! 1 (August 1993).
28. Id. at 2-3.
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mation from the poll was incorporated to ensure the greatest pos-
sible chance of passage.
The first draft was written in September 1993 by attorney
Cheryl K. Smith, who served as a special counsel to the political
action group, Oregon Right to Die ("ORD"). Smith had previ-
ously served as the National Hemlock Society's legal advisor
from 1989 to 1993 and as top aide to then Hemlock director,
Derek Humphry, until he resigned in 1992. While a student at
the University of Iowa College of Law in 1989, Smith helped
draft a "Model Aid-in-Dying Act" which allowed for children's
lives to be terminated either at their request or, if under six
years old, at the request of their parents. 29 Now working as
Legal Services Director for the Oregon Rehabilitation Associa-
tion, she has also authored Departing Drugs, a how-to-commit
suicide manual that is distributed by European euthanasia
groups and is the author of several chapters in the Art and Sci-
ence of Suicide project, an on-line "self-deliverance" instruction
guide marketed by the Right to Die Society of Canada through its
DeathNET site on the Internet.3 °
Early drafts of Measure 16 (then titled, "A Bill for an Act
Relating to the Rights of Patients Who Are Terminally Ill to
Receive Aid-in-Dying") allowed doctors to directly end the lives of
patients by lethal injection. This was considered a potential
stumbling block, however, and was eventually omitted.3 '
Instead, the final draft provided that a doctor could write a pre-
scription for a patient "for medication to end his or her life in a
humane and dignified manner."32 As a means of placating those
who wanted the wording to allow doctors to actually administer
the deadly dose, a compromise was reached by which the physi-
cian as well as others were granted immunity if they were "pres-
ent when a qualified patient takes the prescribed medication to
end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner." 31
29. Craig A. Brandt et al., Model Aid-in-Dying Act, 75 IowA L. REV. 125 (1989-90).
30. John Hofsess' announcement of the availability of the Art & Science of Suicide
project made to the right-to-die mailing list, August 20, 1996. Hofsess described Smith's
chapters: "Ms. Smith's chapters provide specialized information on such subjects as tricy-
clic antidepressants; barbiturates; and carbon monoxide. Each chapter has been updated
(August 1996) to include the latest research available. For example, the barbiturates
article incorporates new information derived from the experience of Compassion in Dying
in Washington State. The carbon monoxide article includes reports of successful suicides
in Canada and the United States using various sources of CO."
31. Tom Bates, Write to Die, OREGoNm4e, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al.
32. OR. DEATH wrrH DiGNrY AcT, MEAsuRE 16, Section 1.01(11). After the passage
of Measure 16, Cheryl Smith wrote that the prescription only aspect was adopted "for the
practical purpose of getting a law passed." Cheryl K Smith, Once more to the ballot box,
LAST RIGHTS, Issue 13, at 42.
33. OR. DEATH wrrK DIGNrrY ACT, MEASUI 16, Section 4.01(1).
Vol. 35:81
The Art of Verbal Engineering
As the measure was evolving, some words and phrases were
sacrificed. Others were carefully selected. "Aid-in-dying," which
had become identified with the failed California and Washington
attempts, was totally eliminated from the title, the definition sec-
tion, all subheadings, and even the body of the measure. The
more soothing phrases, "death with dignity," "to die a dignified
death," and "humane and dignified" were added.
Each word and phrase was meticulously examined for its
potential impact on voters. For example, the first five drafts had
contained the term "informed consent," a medical term meaning
that the patient is fully informed prior to consenting to surgery
or treatment which his or her doctor has recommended. When
ORD members realized that the established term, "informed con-
sent," could pose some nuancing, problems, a new term,
"informed decision,"' was used instead.
Since the polling done to prepare for the bill had shown that
"suicide" did not play well with the public (only 44% of voters
would have favored a law stating that it permitted physician-
assisted suicide), 35 the Dutch solution to word problems was put
into use. Assisted suicide and euthanasia (which were, after all,
the goals of Measure 16) would not be called by their real names:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize a physician
or any other person to end a patient's life by lethal injection,
mercy killing or active euthanasia. Actions taken in accordance
with this Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute suicide,
assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide under the law."
36
On November 8, 1994, Oregon voters approved Measure 16 by
the slimmest of margins (51%-49%). As ERGO!'s Derek Hum-
phry had said when he viewed his poll's results, "[t]he euphe-misms won."37
While the very terms "euthanasia" and "assisted suicide" have
been often replaced by euphemisms such as "gentle landing" and
"deliverance," there are a number of words that are so universal
to any and all so-called right-to-die proposals and policies that
they cannot be replaced. Instead, their interpretations and defi-
nitions have blurred as well as multiplied so that, in any one dis-
cussion, the same word can have as many meanings as there are
speakers and listeners. Among these words are "terminal,"
"imminent," "treatment" and "care." Such a breadth of interpre-
tation can place caregivers and patients in a position where they
34. Id. Section 1.01(7).
35. HUmPHRY, supra note 27, at 2.
36. OR. DEATH wrrIH DIGNITY ACT, MEASURE 16, Section 3.14.
37. Bates, supra note 31.
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are speaking separate languages, one in which the listener inter-
prets a word in a far different way than the speaker intended.
V. THE MANY DEFINITIONS OF DYING
To the lay person, "terminal" means that death is unavoidable
and very close (meaning within days or weeks) no matter what
treatments or interventions are used. Proponents of euthanasia
and assisted suicide have, until recently, stated or implied that
only those whose conditions are considered terminal would be
candidates for accelerated death. At least, this is the framework
within which most media coverage takes place.
This is certainly how the decisions in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington38 and Quill v. Vacco39 have been reported. Indeed,
in Judge Stephen Reinhardt's opinion declaring laws against
assisted suicide unconstitutional, he stated that the court was
only deciding the issue of assisted suicide for the terminally ill.'
At the same time, he hedged by writing, "[o]ur conclusion is
strongly influenced by, but not limited to, the plight of mentally
competent, terminally ill adults."4 '
What does Judge Reinhardt mean by "terminally ill?" He did
not say. Nowhere in the lengthy opinion did he provide a defini-
tion. He did, however, give some emotionally charged descrip-
tions to portray terminally ill people. He wrote that their fate
will be one in which they "can only be maintained in a debilitated
and deteriorating state, unable to enjoy the presence of family or
friends,"42 or one in which they will end up in a "childlike state of
helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent."'
While such language might be useful in a euthanasia organi-
zation's promotional material, it hardly provides guidance about
the meaning of "terminal," a word used by courts and in statutes
to denote legal categories. For example, if an incapacitated per-
son is "terminal," medical treatment can be withheld or with-
drawn based either on the patient's desires as expressed through
an advance directive, or in the "best interests" of the patient
through surrogate decision making. If euthanasia or assisted
suicide is legalized, the presence or absence of a "terminal" condi-
tion would determine whether the state retains an interest in
38. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), en banc, cert.
granted, Washington v. Glucksburg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110).
39. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), en banc, cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill,
65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
40. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 790, 832.
41. Id. at 816.
42. Id. at 821.
43. Id. at 814.
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protecting a patient's life or whether it stands aside indifferently
in the face of induced death. Thus, the applied definition of the
word would literally spell the difference between life and death.
Elsewhere, Judge Reinhardt qualified the undefined "termi-
nal" with the word "imminent" when he wrote that the state has
an almost negligible interest in safeguarding the interests of
third parties "when the patient is terminally ill and his death is
imminent .... ."1 Yet nowhere does his opinion give even a clue
as to the meaning that should be given to the term "imminent."
Likewise, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in its Quill v.
Vacco opinion, failed to give any specifics about what it meant by
"terminal." In finding that the state has no interest in prevent-
ing a patient from obtaining drugs to end life "during the final
stages of a terminal illness,"45 the court either could not find, or
did not look for, any way to explain what it meant by "terminal
illness," let alone its "final stages."
Admittedly, it is extremely difficult to clarify what is meant by
"terminal." Often the closest a physician can come to defining
"terminal" is to use Justice Stewart's words: "I know it when I
see it." 46 This difficulty has been acknowledged in the Nether-
lands and may be one of the reasons that the Dutch made no
attempt to even pay lip service to requiring that one be "termi-
nal" before being eligible for euthanasia.
The Dutch describe "terminal" as a "concrete expectancy of
death."47 No attempt is made to predict when this concrete
expectancy will be fulfilled. Even a Dutch physician who has car-
ried out euthanasia is reluctant to say how long the patient
might have lived otherwise since "any estimate of the extent of
shortening of life can only be very general" and has no "absolute
value."48
Even the most cursory look at advance directive laws in the
United States, which have attempted to define "terminal,"
reveals the evolving nature of the word's meaning. The first such
law, passed in California in 1976, referred to "terminal" as a con-
dition from which death would occur "regardless of the applica-
44. Id. at 827.
45. Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964XStewart, J., concurring). Justice Stew-
art conceded that he might never be able to intelligibly define "hard core pornography,"
but observed, "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that." Id. at 197.
47. PAUL J. VAN DER MAAS ET AL., II EuTHAsiA AND OTHER MEDICAL DECISIONS
CONCERNING THE END OF LFE, 23 (English Translation of Volume II, the Remmelink
Report) (Elvesier 1992).
48. Id. at 23-24.
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tion of life-sustaining procedures." 49  Far broader was the
meaning given the word when the state of Idaho passed its Natu-
ral Death Act the following year. According to the Idaho statute,
a terminal condition was "an incurable physical condition caused
by disease or illness which reasonable medical judgment deter-
mines shortens the lifespan of the patient." 0 Ironically, the early
Idaho definition had great similarity to that which is used by
Jack Kevorkian. Kevorkian contends that a terminal condition is
"any disease that curtails life even for a day"5 ' or "any process
that curtails natural life."52
While there is little doubt that Idaho legislators of the late
1970's probably had a condition such as end stage cancer in
mind, their definition did lend itself to extremely broad interpre-
tation. This is illustrated by Jack Kevorkian's application of the
similar definition to his victims, many of whom had decades of
life remaining but were considered to fit within his definition of
"terminal."
Other states attempted to define the word more precisely. For
example, in 1983 the state of Virginia declared that "terminal"
was not only a condition from which there could be no recovery,
but also that it had to be a condition from which "death is immi-
nent."5 3 One year later, Wisconsin passed its Natural Death Act,
which stated that a condition would be considered "terminal" if
death was expected to occur within thirty days regardless of the
application of life-sustaining procedures.54 Using "imminent" as
a qualifier would seem to provide adequate guidance as to the
meaning of "terminal." In practice, however, "imminent" also
has been found to be open to extremely broad interpretation.
When individuals in Wisconsin thought that the state's thirty
day life expectancy requirement was too restrictive, the law was
amended, changing "would cause death within 30 days" to
"would cause death imminently."55 The change was intended to
permit greater flexibility in interpretation.5 6 Among examples of
this flexibility are the following: A Virginia court determined
that death could be considered "imminent" if it was expected to
49. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 7187.
50. IDAHO CODE Section 39-4503 (2)(1977)(emphasis added).
51. Andrea Stone, Dr. Death: No Law is Needed on Euthanasia, USA TODAY, Oct.
28, 1992, at 6A.
52. Jack Kevorkian, A Modern Inquisition, THE HUMANIST, Nov-Dec. 1994 at 8
(emphasis added).
53. VA. CODE. ANN. Section 54-325.8:2 (1983).
54. Wis. STAT. ANN. Section 154.01(8) (West 1984) (amended 1986).
55. Id. as amended by 1985 Wisc. ACT 199 (April 10, 1986).
56. Ronni L. Scheier, Living Wills Gaining Acceptance, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 1,
1986, at 3, 46; CONCERN FOR DYING NEWSLETTER, Spring 1986 at 4.
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occur within several months57; a Florida hospital began inter-
preting "imminent" to mean that death would occur within one
year;58 and such statements as, "for death to be imminent, the
patient's life expectancy must be one year or less, according to
reasonable medical judgment" began to appear in law journals.59
As one physician testified before a legislative committee, "[t]he
word 'imminent' in medicine is just not useable"60 - nor is it
protective.
In many cases, particularly when the concept of right-to-die
laws was relatively new, seemingly narrow definitions for the
word "terminal" or the addition of words like "imminent" were
added to proposals to assure that they would not be too broadly
interpreted. Even today, many people still maintain the belief
that a diagnosis of a terminal condition has a very specific mean-
ing. Few realize that the same word can simultaneously refer to
conditions that may not cause death for weeks, months or even
years, even if no treatment is provided. Nor are they aware that
one can fall within the category of being in a terminal condition
even if the condition could be controlled indefinitely by some type
of medical intervention.
Such confusion was even evident on the part of Judge Rein-
hardt. In his opinion, attempting to draw a distinction between a
death resulting from an underlying disease and a death occur-
ring from the removal of food and fluids, Judge Reinhardt
referred to the death of Nancy Cruzan: "Ms. Cruzan was not even
terminally ill at the time, but had a life expectancy of 30 years."61
57. Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., No CH 98287 (Virginia Circuit
Court, Fairfax County), August 29, 1986, appeal denied, record no. 86-814 (Va. 1986).
The Hazelton case was the first in which the meaning of"imminent" as it pertained to an
advance directive was at issue. Harriet Hazelton had four attending physicians, all of
whom agreed that she had a probable life expectancy of several months. However, two of
the physicians felt that Ms. Hazelton's death could not be considered "imminent" since
she had months of predicted life. The other two physicians believed that death could not
be considered "imminent" if months of life were expected to remain.
58. James J. McCartney & Jane Mary Trau, Cessation of the Artificial Delivery of
Food and Fluids: Defining Terminal Illness and Care, 14 DEATH STUD. 435, 437 (1990).
In another article, McCartney, the former director of the Bioethics Institute of St. Francis
Hospital in Miami Beach, wrote: "St. Francis Hospital in Miami Beach, Florida (a Catho-
lic Hospital sponsored by the Allegany Franciscan Sisters) has interpreted "imminent" to
mean that death will occur within one year for the purposes of implementing F.S. 765
[Florida's living will law] in accord with hospital policy. Since the legislature has given
no guidance as to what it means by 'imminent,' I believe that this interpretation is as
valid as any other." James J. McCartney, Prolonging Life and the Right to Die, Perspec-
tives from the Catholic and Jewish Traditions (1988) (unpublished, on file with author).
59. Tracy L. Merritt, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified
Death, 39 STAN.L.REv. 689, 731 (1986-1987).
60. Living Wills: Bill abruptly killed, NEWS JouRNAL (Wilmington, Del.), May 31,
1996, at A4.
61. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822.
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Judge Reinhardt apparently did not know that in at least one
state within the Ninth Circuit, those in conditions like that of
Nancy Cruzan are specifically defined, by statute, as "terminally
ill." Arizona's "Medical Treatment - Termination of Life-Sus-
taining Procedures Act" is but one example. It states: "Terminal
condition includes a permanent vegetative state and irreversible
coma."62 If it is difficult for a Federal Appeals Court judge to
keep up to date on the many and changing legal meanings for
"terminal," it is no leap of the imagination to assume that others,
not versed in the law, may also lack understanding of the very
words which could affect them greatly.
It is not only laws that have stretched the boundaries of defini-
tion and interpretation. Some policies, as exemplified in guide-
lines for Veterans Administration hospitals, have such great
elasticity that even individuals whose conditions are solely
related to arthritis or mental illness could fall within the cate-
gory of the "terminally ill." Veterans Administration hospital
guidelines have defined "terminal, illness" to include "chronic
debilitating conditions from which there is no reasonable hope of
recovery."
63
Well meaning though they may be, individuals who believe
that assisted suicide and euthanasia can be limited to those who
are in a "terminal" condition are naive. Their illusory safeguards
will not protect those in the ever-expanding group of candidates
for the "treatment" of death. Just as the word "terminal" has
become as hard to pin down as jello to the wall, so, too, has the
word "treatment" been pulled and stretched out of shape. Eutha-
nasia advocates have seized upon this in furtherance of their
political and social goals.
VI. THE MORPHING OF "TREATMENT"
Televised political advertising in the 1990's has made effective
use of what is known as "morphing" (derived from the word "met-
amorphosis"). With this technique, one image is smoothly trans-
formed into another. Even though it is happening before the
viewer's eyes, it creates the illusion that the final image was
always there, making it difficult to recall that the final image did
not begin as it ended. The purpose is to convey a powerful visual
symbolism replacing substantive discussion.
62. ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. Section 36-3201(6) (1985) (amended 1991) (emphasis
added).
63. VETERANs ADMmmNSTRATiON POLICY GLUMELMES, Nov. 18, 1991, M-2, Part I,
Chap. 31, Paragraph 31.02, at 31-2.
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So, too, in the legal and public relations campaigns to gain
acceptance for assisted suicide and euthanasia, a form of linguis-
tic morphing has transpired. Like its first cousin, visual morph-
ing, the linguistic version is designed to change public perception
and pave the way for acceptance of previously unthinkable pro-
posals; all without in depth or substantive analysis.
For example, current attempts to categorize intentionally pre-
scribed fatal overdoses and lethal injections as "treatment" are
the culmination of a carefully constructed bridge built from the
traditional understanding of the term (i.e. an attempt to cure or
ameliorate a medical condition) to a new, deadly, and very final
"treatment" (i.e. killing). As with the word "terminal," the aver-
age person maintains a belief that the word "treatment" is sim-
ply and easily interpreted, referring to medical interventions
intended to cure or ameliorate a condition. But, as with the
understanding of terminal illness, the public perception of what
is meant by medical treatment is stalled: stranded in a time
when a desire to forego life-sustaining treatment meant only that
one did not want to be tethered to machines, monitors, buzzers,
bells and whistles during the final days of life.
Quite simply, the debate about treatment has traveled so far
beyond the original meaning of the word that it almost begs for
redefinition in Webster's. The tracks have been switched, moving
no longer in the direction of natural death but, instead, careen-
ing toward killing in the name of compassion.
Pivotal in this shift was what has become known as the "food
and fluids issue." No matter the view that one may maintain
regarding the removal of food and fluids from patients, there can
be no legitimate denial that nutrition and hydration cases have
had significant impact on the current status of the right-to-die
debate.
The fundamental moral consensus-that patients should
receive care, including nutrition and fluids-came under attack
in the 1980's. Debates began to be waged in bioethics circles
about the propriety of withdrawing tube feeding from brain dam-
aged or demented patients. No one contended, even then, that a
dying patient who could not assimilate food and fluids or for
whom the means of their provision was a source of great discom-
fort should be given them anyway. To do so would be futile and
cruel. What did become a matter or debate was whether food
and fluids that were effectively sustaining life could be removed
for nonmedical reasons, with the intent of causing death.
The authors' discussion about the reclassification of food and
fluids from "care" to "treatment" is not intended to reargue the
food and fluids issue. Instead, it is intended to provide a back-
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ground of the manner in which society and the courts have
reached a point where legitimizing the removal of food and fluids
by calling this the "removal of 'treatment' has set the stage for
the attempt to legitimize giving intentionally lethal medications
under the guise of "provision of 'treatment.'"
In 1983, reflecting on the possible outcome of the debate,
Daniel Callahan, then Director of the Hastings Center, wrote
that "a denial of nutrition, may, in the long run, become the only
effective way to make certain that a large number of biologically
tenacious patients actually die."64 He further predicted, "[g]iven
the increasingly large pool of superannuated, chronically ill,
physically marginal elderly, it could well become the nontreat-
ment of choice."65 He noted, however, that there still was a
"deep-seated revulsion"66 to withholding or withdrawing food
from patients.
While many individuals who, in the upcoming years, lent their
support to the concept of removing food and fluids saw little or no
connection between that and assisted suicide or euthanasia,
leaders of the right-to-die movement were quick to recognize that
they could capitalize on its acceptance. This was evident in the
remarks of Helga Kuhse, who is a long time leader in the eutha-
nasia movement. Speaking at a 1984 international conference of
euthanasia leaders, Kuhse, who is a philosophy professor at Aus-
tralia's Monash University, said that once people see how painful
death by starvation and dehydration is, then, "in the patient's
best interest," they will accept the lethal injection. 7
Considerable verbal engineering was required to transform
denial of food and fluids into an appealing "removal of treat-
ment." A series of cases related to the removal of food and fluids
provided by means of a tube was the starting point.68 Addition-
ally, in media accounts, the very nature of providing nourish-
ment by means of tube became distorted. It was constantly
depicted as a rare, exotic procedure of recent origin that required
constant monitoring by highly skilled medical professionals.
64. Daniel Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at
22.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Helga Kuhse, Remarks at the World Federation of Right to Die Societies' Fifth
biennial conference, Sept. 20-23, 1984.
68. See generally Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E. 626 (Mass.
1986); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1986); Gray v Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I.
1988); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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In fact, food and water have been provided by means of a gas-
tronomy tube for over one hundred years 9 and according to a
government report, at least 848,100 people per year receive food
by means of a tube in hospitals, nursing homes or in their own
homes.7 ° A gastronomy tube, inserted through the abdominal
wall directly into the stomach, is a simple surgical procedure
that can be performed under local anesthesia. Once inserted, the
small incision heals and its presence causes essentially no dis-
comfort to the majority of people.7' Yet, in the debate over fluid
and foods, this simple procedure has been described as one which
is highly invasive and highly risky.
The 1984 case of Mary Hier v2 illustrates how the classification
of tube feeding as a "medical treatment" can be used when the
intent is to withhold food and fluids. Ninety-two-year-old Mary
Hier had lived in a state hospital for more than fifty-seven years.
Elderly and demented, she thought she was the Queen of Eng-
land. She was not terminally ill. Because a Zenkers diverticu-
lum in Ms. Hier's pharyngeal esophagus made it almost
impossible for adequate food and fluids to pass down her esopha-
gus to her stomach, she had received food by means of a gastron-
omy tube for many years. When, in an unexplained incident, Ms.
Hier's gastronomy tube became dislodged, the care facility
sought to replace the tube.
Although her guardian ad litem argued that nutrition should
be differentiated from treatment, the court declared, "[w]e do not
agree that such a distinction should be drawn as a matter of
law."7 3 The court noted that the 1983 President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine had taken the posi-
tion that "artificial feeding" should be thought of as a "treatment"
decision.74 Additionally, the court found that replacing Ms.
Hier's gastronomy tube would entail a "major medical proce-
dure" that was "highly intrusive" and entailed a "relatively high
69. Two articles published in a 1896 publication, describe the ease with which feed-
ing by gastronomy tube was accomplished at that time. McMurtry, Modern Gastrostomy
for Stricture of the Esophagus, with Report of a Case; and Coomes, Gastronomy, with
Report of a Case, TRANSACTIONS OF THE KENTUCKY MEDICAL SOCIETY (1896).
70. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Life-Sustaining Technologies
and the Elderly, (1987) at 924.
71. By No ExTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD
AND WATER 26 (Joanne Lynn ed. 1986).
72. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
73. Id. at 964.
74. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STuDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE




risk to the patient due to her age." 5 Permission to replace the
tube was denied.
Mary Hier's story and her life might have ended there had it
not been for the fact that just as her case was reported, another
story appeared in the same newspaper. It concerned a ninety-
four-year-old woman who was doing well following "minor sur-
gery to correct a nutritional problem." The surgery had been per-
formed on an outpatient basis under local anesthesia. The
woman's name was Rose Kennedy and the "minor surgery to cor-
rect a nutritional problem" was the insertion of a gastronomy
tube.76 For ninety-four-year-old Rose Kennedy, matriarch of a
rich and powerful family, tube feeding was a mere correction of a
nutritional problem. For ninety-two-year-old Mary Hier, poor
and mentally ill, it was termed "medical treatment" that was too
invasive and risky for a woman of her age. Last minute interven-
tion by a local physician and an attorney did eventually lead to
Mary Hier's tube feeding being provided again, and both Mary
Hier and Rose Kennedy lived for many years.
The choice of words to describe the method of providing food
and fluids, as illustrated in the case of Mary Hier, depends upon
whether the discussion is intended to lead to their being provided
or withheld. Manipulative terminology (i.e., using the language
of treatment rather than care) has also been used to describe not
only the tube but also the food itself. For example, referring to
food received by tube as "artificially implanted nutrition and
hydration" 7 seemed a patent attempt to create the illusion that
food and fluids themselves are exotic medical treatment. Yet it
seems doubtful that those who contend that food and fluids
become "treatment" if taken by tube would tolerate others calling
penicillin or milk of magnesia "food" when taken by mouth.
VII. LUNCH TRAYS BEARING TREATMENT
Whether one agrees or disagrees with what has transpired, the
reality is that by the time of the Cruzan7 case, the provision of
food and fluids by means of a tube was clearly considered to be a
form of medical treatment by society at large and the courts. By
the time Cruzan was decided, however, some ethicists and right-
to-die advocates had begun to expand the boundaries of "treat-
75. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d at 964.
76. Rose Kennedy doing well after surgery, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1984 at 35.
77. Brief of Amici Curiae SSM Health System, St. Joseph Health Care System,
Mercy Health Services, Catholic Health Corporation, Rev. J. McCartney, Rev. Kevin
O'Rourke, and Center for Health Care Ethics, St. Louis University Medical Center,
Cruzan at 8.
78. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
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ment" once again; this time to include oral feeding as a medical
intervention that could be withheld or withdrawn ethically. The
spotlight had now shifted from the method by which food and
fluids were provided to the actual food and fluids, no matter how
provided.
It is no longer unusual to observe a dispassionate discussion
among ethicists and medical professionals about the withdrawal
of oral feeding from frail, elderly or brain damaged, but non-
dying patients. Such discussions take place at many confer-
ences, and can also be observed on the Internet. They certainly
take place in the clinical setting.
The willingness to extend denial of even spoon feeding was
also apparent in the 1988 testimony of Ronald Cranford, M.D., in
the Cruzan case. Cranford, an associate physician in neurology
at Hennepin County Medical Center in Minneapolis, testified
that there really is no definition of "artificial" feeding.7 9 He said
that if Ms. Cruzan were able to take food orally, he would still
consider provision of food in this manner to be "medical
treatment."
o8
This 1988 statement, that no definition of "artificial" feeding
exists, differed from a position Cranford had held only four years
earlier when he differentiated between "artificial means" (naso-
gastric tubes, gastronomy tubes, hyperalimentation and intrave-
nous lines) and the ability to take food by the "natural route." At
that time, he specifically stated that "it may be justifiable to con-
sider withdrawal of fluids and nutrition given by an artificial
route."" However, by the time he testified in 1988, he included
spoon feeding in the category of what might be considered "artifi-
cial feeding." "There is a legitimate difference of opinion concern-
ing spoon feeding," he said. "It is not fair to say that artificial
feeding would only characterize what we call gastronomy and so
forth." 2 Cranford stated that spoon feeding is denied in cases
like Ms. Cruzan's (where profound brain damage has occurred)
because to spoon feed her "would be totally inconsistent" with
what was wanted (i.e. death for the patient).8 3
79. Tr. at 228, Cruzan v. Harman, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)(en banc)(No. CV384-
9P, affd 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
80. Tr. at 163, Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 408.
81. Ronald Cranford, Termination of Treatment in the Persistent Vegetative State, 4
SEMINARS IN NEUROLOGY, 41. (emphasis added).
82. Tr. at 228, Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 408.
83. Tr. at 229. The year after this testimony, Cranford and eleven other physician
authors published an article in which they concluded that it is morally acceptable for
doctors to give patients suicide information and the prescription for a lethal dose. Sidney
H. Wanzer et al. The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second
Look, 320 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 844, 847 (1989). The article was a "report" of a twelve
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In another 1988 case also involving the denial of food and
fluids for a patient who was no longer able to make medical deci-
sions, a physician reasoned that if a patient is in a convalescent
care facility, even the patient's normal diet must be prescribed;
therefore it is always medical treatment."4 Thus, in the minds of
some, the food on a nursing home patient's tray had now become
"treatment" and, as such, could be considered optional.
By 1994, virtually anything that a physician authorized, pre-
scribed, or performed was said by some to fall within the mean-
ing of "treatment." This was evident in testimony given before
the Senate Finance Committee by Eric J. Cassell, M.D., of Cor-
nell University Medical College, who stated, "treatments are not
merely technologies or drugs, virtually everything done to or for
a sick person is part of the treatment.""5
The notion that all patient care, even the provision of food and
fluids taken by mouth, was "treatment" which could be withheld
or withdrawn had gained wide acceptance within professional
circles. The general public, however, was still far from embrac-
ing death by starvation and dehydration as a desirable, noble
"option" to be sought. The bridge from tolerance of the concept to
widespread support for it was still needed if assisted suicide was
to gain a foothold.
As far back as 1972, at a conference of the Euthanasia Educa-
tional Council, Cassell acknowledged this when, during a discus-
sion of effective ways to commit suicide and assisted suicide, he
stated:
8 6
Maybe we ought to accord the right of the suicide [sic] to make it an
elegant and noble move. What you're describing is a turn around of
society in which death becomes the elegant thing: in which you
achieve an age when it's proper for you to die and to get help in your
dying, and you arrange for a death that's appropriate to your life, with
physician panel funded by the Society for the Right to Die, previously known as the
Euthanasia Society of America. In 1992, Cranford joined the board of directors of the
organization which by then had changed its name again, this time to Choice in Dying.
During a nationally televised interview regarding the article, Cranford acknowledged
that assisting suicide is "the same as killing the patient." MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour
(PBS television broadcast, March 30, 1989). He explained, "we broke new ground, and we
were very aware we were doing it. We felt it was an opportunity to make a statement
that's very controversial and stand by it." Id.
84. Tr. at 56; McConnell v. Beverly Enter.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn.
1989)(Nos. 13477-13479).
85. Eric Cassell, M.D., Testimony before the Committee of Finance, United States
Senate, May 5, 1994, at 4.
86. The Euthanasia Educational Council began in 1967 as a branch of the Eutha-
nasia Society of America. It was then called the Euthanasia Educational Fund. Soon
after, it changed its name to the Euthanasia Educational Council and then, in 1978,
became known as Concern for Dying. Currently, Concern for Dying, along with the group
originally called the Euthanasia Society of America, is called Choice in Dying.
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all the fittings, without pain and the proper pill 7 .... What seems to
me I hear [when people request assisted suicide] is a way to dignify it,
making it an honorable thing to do, make it respected by other people.
That's a profound change in the structure of society which may well
come, but it's going to be a while coming. It's not just the finding of
the pill - that can be found. It's the finding of the world in which one
would have one's death as one would have one's wedding and a few
other things .... 88
VII. SELLING THE A2rrRACTIVENESS OF PLANNED DEATH
The process of dignifying death by starvation began in a 1994
article by David Eddy, M.D., Ph.D., published in the Journal of
the American Medical Association.9 In the article, dehydrating
to death was portrayed as a way for an elderly woman with no
life threatening condition to end her life "gracefully."
Dr. Eddy wrote that his mother was a spunky, self-sufficient
widow who had enjoyed an abundant life and who, when ail-
ments made her quality of life no longer acceptable, decided it
was time to die. As a physician's wife, she was used to thinking
about life and death and prided herself on being able to deal
maturely with the idea of death.90
With her son, she explored ways to end her life. "Can I stop
eating?" she asked. He told her that if she was really intent on
dying she should stop drinking, too, since "without water, no one,
not even the healthiest, can live more than a few days."91
On her eighty-fifth birthday, Virginia Eddy celebrated with
her family at a party with all the trimmings. Then, her son
wrote, "she relished her last piece of chocolate, and then stopped
eating and drinking."92 Her son arranged for her to be placed on
a self-administered morphine drip to relieve the pain of dehydra-
tion. She died six days later.
"This death was not a sad death; it was a happy death," Eddy
wrote. "She had done just what she wanted to do, just the way
she wanted to do it." According to Eddy, his mother had chosen
87. EUTHANASIA EDUC. COUNCIL, EUTHANASIA: RIGHTS & REALIEs, EXCEPTS
FROM PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS AT THE FIFTH EUTHANASIA CONFERENCE, Dec. 2, 1972, at
24.
88. Id. at 26.
89. David M. Eddy, A Conversation with My Mother, 272 JAMA 179 (1994). Eddy
is a professor of health policy and management at Duke University and a policy adviser to
Kaiser Permanente Southern California. He has also advised President Clinton and Blue
Cross/Blue Shield on health policy, and he is a strong advocate for health care rationing.
See, e.g., David Eddy, Health System Reform: Will Controlling Costs Require Rationing
Services?, 272 JAMA 324-328 (1994).
90. Id. at 179.




the time and manner of her death and this had been a positive
experience for the entire family. He provided, "[a]lthough we will
miss her greatly, her ability to achieve her death at the 'right
time' and in her 'right way' transformed for us what could have
been a desolate and crushing loss into a time for joy."
93
Clearly, this article was intended to significantly influence its
readers' attitudes. In fact, the piece was referred to in a report
about the impact of medical journal articles on public opinion,
clinical-care standards and health care policies. George Lund-
berg, M.D., who oversees all of the American Medical Associa-
tion's forty-seven professional journals including JAMA, called
Eddy's article the "most important article published in the last
50 years." He said, "[t]he openness of the presentation, the com-
petence and compassion, and the method of dying - by with-
holding food or drink - were all salutary. The argument
presented was legal,, ethical, moral and loving." Lundberg pre-
dicted it would become "a landmark model of dying."94
The Hemlock Society's medical director, Richard MacDonald,
M.D., who was, at the time, campaigning to legalize assisted sui-
cide in Oregon, jumped on the bandwagon. He wrote, "[sihe
[Mrs. Eddy] chose a very rational course, which is the right of
every patient - to refuse treatment [i.e. post-birthday meals and
beverages] which can extend life but is futile as far as improving
the quality of life or curing the diseases contributing to that poor
quality." Then, making a pitch for Oregon's Measure 16, Mac-
Donald added that "such a peaceful end to suffering is not often
available to someone who doesn't have the good fortune to have a
physician for a son, as this patient did."
95
It was not the method of induced death that was emphasized
but rather the "right" to choose how, when, where and why to die,
and the right of someqne else to "assist" in bringing about that
death, that was being promoted. MacDonald and others
campaigning for the Oregon initiative were working to extend
the "good fortune" of Mrs. Eddy to all Oregonians by legalizing
what would later be termed "comfort care."
IX. SAFE HARBOR FOR DOCTORS, DEATH FOR PATIENTS
The Eddy article was indicative of yet another attitudinal
shift, one that now saw intentionally ending life with a doctor's
93. Id.
94. Jennifer LaBarbera, Editors of Medical Journals Wield Pens with the Deftness
of Scalpels, PHYsiciANs FINANcIAL NEWS, Sept. 30, 1994 at 26.
95. Richard MacDonald, M.D., JAMA Article: Model of American Death?, HEMLOCK
TnIELnms (Hemlock Society), Sept.-Oct. 1994 at 4.
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assistance as a graceful exit from life. The right to be free of
unwanted treatment had been totally transformed into the right
to be free of unwanted life.
It had taken many years, many attempts, many returns to the
drawing board, so to speak, and more than anything else, careful
manipulation of language. In November of 1994, Oregon, with
the passage of Measure 16, became the only state in the history
of the nation to approve a proposal permitting physicians to
intentionally prescribe lethal overdoses to certain patients.
Because of an on-going legal challenge,96 Measure 16 has not
gone into effect. As in previous attempts in Washington and Cal-
ifornia to legalize assisted suicide and euthanasia, proponents
stated that the purpose of the law was to give a new "right" to
patients.
In fact, the major impact of legalizing assisted suicide was not
to give rights to those who would be dead, but was to bestow
immunity on those who would be instrumental in making them
dead. This was acknowledged by Barbara Coombs Lee, Measure
16's chief petitioner, who described the measure, saying, "[t]he
[Death with Dignity] act creates a safe harbor in Oregon's
assisted suicide laws for an attending physician to provide a pre-
scription for lethal medication ... . Lee has been vague in
describing how the waters in this "safe harbor" would be
navigated.
Asked how patient deaths would actually be brought about,
she said that the new law is not specific since "it would be pretty
outlandish to tell physicians what particular mode of care to pro-
vide."" When questioned about the need to educate physicians
regarding assisted suicide, she opined that courses dealing with
assisted suicide would eventually be taught in medical schools,
saying, "[w]riting a lethal prescription is one very small aspect of
the total care of terminally ill individuals." 9
Problematic, of course, is the way a prescription for "care" of
this type would be labeled. Lee explained that a physician might
write something like, "take as needed to control symptoms."100
Without question, a prescription for this type of "care" would
"control symptoms"-permanently. That, however, leads to the
96. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
97. Barbara Coombs Lee: Assisted Suicide in the United States, Testimony Before
the House Subcommittee on the Constitution (April 29, 1996) (emphasis added).
98. Tom Bates, Questions Asked About Assisted Suicide, Chief Petitioner Answers
Questions on Measure 16, OREGONIAN, Nov. 27, 1994, at A20 (emphasis added).




difficulty about how the outcome of this "care" would be
described.
Almost immediately after Measure 16's passage, rhetorical
gymnastics reached Olympian proportions as attempts were
made to come up with a label for the new death-producing medi-
cal procedure. The problem was, how should deaths in compli-
ance with Measure 16 be categorized, particularly on death
certificates? If the law survives legal challenges and goes into
effect, such deaths cannot be called "suicides" because Measure
16 prohibits suicide and assisted suicide. 101 Lee claimed that the
word "suicide" would not apply and asked that deaths resulting
from the lethal drug overdose be called "self-administration
under Measure 16, "102 while the Oregon Health Division recom-
mended that the cause of death be designated "drug overdose,
legally prescribed.' 3 As far as categorizing the deadly practice
for purposes of payment, Oregon's Medicaid director, Jean
Thorne, said the procedure would be covered under a part of the
Oregon Health Plan called "comfort care. "104
As Oregonian reporter Mark O'Keefe observed, "[o]ne thing is
certain. Terminology matters. If it did not, politicians would not
call tax increase 'revenue enhancements.' Corporations firing
thousands of employees would not describe that act as a 'work-
force adjustment." 10 5 And a group that provides suicide assist-
ance would not call itself "Compassion in Dying." During the
first thirteen months of its operation, before it brought a court
challenge to Washington's law prohibiting assisted suicide, it
counseled twenty-four patients who committed suicide with pre-
scription drugs. Since then, it has refused to divulge the number
of deaths with which it has been involved.
10 6
Compassion in Dying grew out of the Hemlock Society's failed
1991 attempt to pass an "aid-in-dying" initiative in Washington
State. Until recently, the group was headed by Ralph Mero, who
had previously served as executive director of Hemlock of Wash-
ington State. (In the summer of 1996, Barbara Coombs Lee,
Measure 16's chief petitioner, left her position as vice president
101. See supra note 36.
102. Mark O'Keefe, Doctor-Assisted-Suicide Law Boils Down to a War of Words,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
103. Id.
104. Dan Postrel, State could cover assisted suicide, SALEM STATESMAN-JOURNAL,
Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
105. OKeefe, supra note 102.
106. William Cartsen, When Patients Choose to Die: Seattle Group Gives Assisted
Suicide Momentum in Courts, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1996, at Al.
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for a large Oregon managed care program and took over the helm
of Compassion in Dying.)
As the first U.S. group to publicly admit to offering assistance
in committing suicide, 10 7 the Hemlock spin-off received a gigantic
boost in achieving one of Hemlock's objectives-the right to
decide the manner and means of deathl°S-when Judge Stephen
Reinhardt wrote that there is a constitutionally-protected liberty
interest in determining the "time and manner" of death. 10 9
The Compassion in Dying opinion presents a stark picture of
the progress that has been made toward accomplishing the
euthanasia agenda by distorting legal precedent, misrepresent-
ing philosophical principles, and twisting the meanings of words.
For example, contrary to Judge Reinhardt's opinion, Cruzan"10
did not recognize a "liberty interest in hastening one's own
death.""' It had, as its underlying rationale, the right to be free
of bodily invasion, not the right to be free of life. Similarly,
Judge Reinhardt's contention that the principle of double effect
permits a doctor to intentionally "assist" a patient "to die
through medical treatment"1 2 completely disregards that princi-
ple's elements." 3  Judge Reinhardt not only gave judicial
approval to the intentional termination of a patient's life, but did
so in a style previously reserved by the most outspoken euthana-
sia activists: placing the labels "medical treatment"114 or "medi-
cal function" on actions that have death as their "necessary and
"115inevitable consequence ....
107. Dick Lehr, Supporting Those Who Want to Die: A Seattle Group Including Doc-
tors and Clergy, Offers Help and Advice for the Suicidal, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1994 at
8.
108. HEMLOCK QuARTERLY (Hemlock Society), Oct. 1980, at 5. Faye Girsh, Hem-
lock's executive director, has reaffirmed that group's long held position that there is right
to a "certain death" that can "only be accomplished with the help of a doctor." (Position
statement of Hemlock USA, issued by Faye Girsh, Aug. 23, 1996).
109. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793.
110. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
111. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
112. Id. at 828, n.102.
113. The "Principle of Double Effect" provides that it is permissible to perform an
act that has both a good effect and a bad effect only if all of the following conditions are
met:
1. The act to be done must be good in itself or at least indifferent.
2. The good effect must not be obtained by means of the bad effect.
3. The bad effect must not be intended for itself but only permitted.
4. There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the bad effect.
A. FAGOTHEY, RIGHT AND REAsON: ETmIcs N THEORY AND PRACTICE, 152-60 (Mosby, St.
Louis, 2d ed. 1959).
114. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 828 n.102.
115. Id. at 829.
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For a number of years, Jack Kevorkian has been carrying out
actions that have death as their inevitable consequence. Like
Judge Reinhardt, he refers to such acts as medical treatment.
1 6
By mid-August 1996, when the body count from Kevorkian's
"treatment" had reached thirty-eight "patients," Linda Emanuel,
vice president of ethics for the American Medical Association,
remarked, "[tihe bizarre has become normal and the ghastly is no
longer seen as ghastly.""
7
Judge Reinhardt has given the ghastly a judicial seal of
approval.
X. CONCLUSION
The success or failure of political or social revolutions often
depends on the terms used in the debate. If the movement is in
accord with accepted values as expressed by language, success is
often the result.
But what if the existing lexicon and traditional understanding
of words and phrases hurts the cause and bogs down the move-
ment? The answer is simple: if the people do not want to follow
where you want to take them, make the destination appear more
attractive.
This is precisely what proponents of the "right to die" have
done. By using fuzzy euphemisms, blurring vital distinctions,
using imprecise phraseology and redefining well-understood con-
cepts and ethical principles, they created an "Alice Through the
Looking Glass World," where previously understood concepts no
longer apply. It is as if "up" were now "down" and "hot" were now
"cold." Words only mean what the speaker intends them to
mean, regardless of the understanding of the listener.
Terms like "killing" and "suicide," which have precise defini-
tions but negative connotations have become outcasts; replaced
by subjective, feel-good, meaningless phrases such as "gentle
landing," "deliverance," "chosen death," or the ubiquitous "death
with dignity." Thus, the ongoing revolution in ethics and values
was preceded by a radical shift in the use of language, all
116. During one week in August 1996, Jack Kevorkian "assisted" four deaths. One
was the death by lethal injection of Judith Curren, who was taken to Michigan by her
physician husband. Curren had no life threatening condition but had a history of depres-
sion. She was also the alleged victim of spousal abuse. Following Curren's death, Kevor-
kian and his attorney said it was Curren's unacceptable quality of life that made it
necessary to end her suffering by means of a "medical procedure." See Indira
Lakshmanan and Doreen Vigue, Death ended a troubled relationship, BosToN GLOBE,
Aug. 24, 1996; Kevorkian Defends Actions on NBC, AP, Aug. 26, 1996.
117. No Legal Action is Anticipated as Kevorkian Suicides Multiply, WASHINGTON
PosT, Aug. 24, 1996, at A2.
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intended to beckon us to embark on a journey to radical social
change.
That direction may or may not be where we, as a society, will
want to go. But one thing is certain. We need to use clear defini-
tions and accurate terminology if we are to truly understand
what awaits us at the end of that road.

